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IS THAT A THREAT?: ELONIS V.
UNITED STATES AND THE
STANDARD OF INTENT FOR TRUE
THREAT CONVICTIONS
PETER S. LARSON
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
1
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Even though the Supreme
Court has held many regulations of speech constitutional, those laws
regulating the content of speech garner the strictest standard of
constitutional scrutiny. Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that
2
Congress can regulate certain categories of speech based on content.
One such category is “true threats” of physical violence, first
3
delineated in Watts v. United States. In 1939, Congress in-part
regulated true threats with 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Now, in Elonis v. United
4
States, the Court must decide exactly what speech constitutes a “true
threat.” Must the speaker have subjectively intended to threaten
another person? Or is it enough that a reasonable speaker would
have foreseen someone interpreting the speech as a threat?
Elonis is a ground-breaking case. Not only does it mark the first
5
time the Court will consider limits for speech on social media, but it
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (“From 1791 to the present . . .
the First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited
areas.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992))).
3. 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
4. No. 13-983 (U.S. argued Dec. 1, 2014).
5. Emily Bazelon, Do Online Death Threats Count as Free Speech?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/magazine/do-online-death-threats-count-as-freespeech.html.
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is the Court’s first examination of true-threat jurisprudence since
6
2003’s Virginia v. Black. In Black, the Court did not decide whether a
“true threat” required that the speaker subjectively intend to threaten
the listener. Elonis places this question directly before the Court.
This commentary will relate the factual background of the case,
including the speech that was the basis for Anthony Elonis’s
indictment. Then it will examine the Supreme Court’s protectedspeech precedent and its true-threat jurisprudence in particular as
well as the Third Circuit’s holding in the case below. It then highlights
each side’s arguments for why the statute and the First Amendment
do or do not compel courts to use a subjective-intent standard. After
analyzing those arguments in light of Watts and Black it concludes
that the Court will likely reverse the Third Circuit’s decision and hold
that a finding of subjective intent is required.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In May 2010, Anthony Elonis’s wife of seven years left him, taking
7
their two kids with her. The following October, Elonis was fired from
his job at Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom, an amusement park in
Allentown, Pennsylvania, because of a photograph he had posted on
8
Facebook taken during his office’s Halloween party. The photo
showed Elonis in a costume, holding a knife to a coworker’s throat
9
with the caption, “I wish.” His boss saw the post and fired him that
10
same day.
Two days after he was fired, Elonis took to Facebook. He first
11
posted about his former employer, Dorney Park, imagining the fear
his former coworkers must feel not knowing whether he still had keys
12
to the gates. He also posted about his estranged wife: “[i]f I only
knew then what I know now, I would have smothered your ass with a
pillow, dumped your body in the back seat, dropped you off in Toad
13
Creek, and made it look like a rape and murder.” He posted more
14
about his wife in comments on her sister’s status updates. For
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

538 U.S. 343 (2003).
United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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example, when his wife’s sister posted about going Halloween
costume shopping with his children, Elonis commented, “Tell [my son]
he should dress up as matricide for Halloween. I don’t know what his
15
costume would entail though. Maybe [my wife’s] head on a stick?”
16
He also posted in October 2010:
There’s one way to love you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m
not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and
dying from all the little cuts. Hurry up and die, bitch, so I can bust
this nut all over your corpse from atop your shallow grave. I used
to be a nice guy but then you became a slut. Guess it’s not your
fault you liked your daddy raped you. So hurry up and die, bitch,
17
so I can forgive you.

As a result of these statements, a state court issued Elonis’s wife a
18
restraining order against him on November 4, 2010. In response,
Elonis posted again on November 7, this time an adaptation of the
19
Whitest Kids U’ Know sketch “It’s Illegal to Say. . .”:
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife?
It’s illegal.
It’s indirect criminal contempt.
It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not allowed to say.
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just
telling you that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife.
I’m not actually saying it.
I’m just letting you know that it’s illegal for me to say that.
It’s kind of like a public service.
I’m letting you know so that you don’t accidently go out and say
something like that.
Um, what’s interesting is that it’s very illegal to say I really, really
think someone out there should kill my wife.
That’s illegal.
Very, very illegal.
But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Whitest Kids U’ Know: I Want to Kill the President (Fuse broadcast Apr. 24, 2007),
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEQOvyGbBtY.
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Because that’s its own sentence.
It’s an incomplete sentence but it may have nothing to do with the
sentence before that. So that’s perfectly fine.
Perfectly legal.
I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, extremely illegal, to go
on Facebook and say something like the best place to fire a mortar
launcher at her house would be from the cornfield behind it
because of easy access to a getaway road and you’d have a clear
line of sight through the sun room.
Insanely illegal.
Ridiculously, wrecklessly, insanely illegal.
Yet even more illegal to show an illustrated diagram.

Insanely illegal.
Ridiculously, horribly felonious.
Cause they will come to my house in the middle of the night and
they will lock me up.
Extremely against the law.
Uh, one thing that is technically legal to say is that we have a
group that meets Fridays at my parent’s house and the password is
20
sic simper tyrannis.

And on November 15, Elonis posted threats to both his wife and
21
to local law enforcement on Facebook:
Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?
Try to enforce an Order
That was improperly granted in the first place
Me thinks the judge needs an education on true threat
jurisprudence

20. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324–25.
21. Id. at 325–26.
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And prison time will add zeroes to my settlement
Which you won’t see a lick
Because you suck dog dick in front of children
***
And if worse comes to worse
I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the state police and the
sheriff’s department
22

[]link: Freedom of Speech, www.wikipedia.org[]

Elonis’s November 16 Facebook post was the basis of Count Four,
23
threats to a kindergarten class:
That’s it, I’ve had about enough
I’m checking out and making a name for myself
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most
heinous school shooting ever imagined
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class
24

The only question is . . . which one?

After monitoring Elonis’s public Facebook posts, FBI agents went
to his house to interview him, but Elonis closed the door on them
once they had identified themselves and confirmed that he was “free
25
to go.” He then returned to Facebook and posted the following,
26
which became the basis for Count Five, threats to an FBI agent:
You know your shit’s ridiculous when you have the FBI knockin’
at yo’ door
Little Agent Lady stood so close
Took all the strength I had not to turn the bitch ghost
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat
Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms of her partner
[laughter]
So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert while you’re at it
Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ a bomb
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Why do you think it took me so long to get dressed with no shoes
on?
I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and pat me down
Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all goin’
27

[BOOM!]

28

Elonis was arrested on December 8, 2010. The grand jury
indicted him on five counts of making threatening communications in
29
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). His pre-trial motion to dismiss the
30
indictment was denied. At trial, a jury acquitted Elonis on Count
One, threatening the patrons and employees of Dorney Park, but
convicted him on Counts Two through Five: threatening his wife, the
employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and Berks County
31
Sheriff’s Department, a kindergarten class, and an FBI agent. The
court then sentenced him to forty-four months in prison, followed by
32
three years of supervised release. His post-trial motions were denied
33
and he appealed his conviction to the Third Circuit.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Interstate Communications
Elonis was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which provides
“[w]hoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or
34
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” The statute was
35
enacted in 1939 in the wake of laws aimed at extortion in kidnapping
36
cases.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 327.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C.A. § 875(c) (West 2014).
35. Pub. L. No. 76-76, 53 Stat. 742 (1939).
36. See, e.g., Act of July 8, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-274, 47 Stat. 649, codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §
876 (West 2014).
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B. Reading in a Mens Rea Requirement
37

Mens rea is Latin for “guilty mind.” The mens rea requirement is
fundamental in criminal law. It takes the form of the varying intent
requirements, such as intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence,
which a legislature may attach to conduct it proscribes. Even where a
statute does not specify a mens rea element, the rule is for courts to
nonetheless presume “that some form of scienter is to be implied,”
38
absent a clear instruction from Congress to the contrary. At trial, the
prosecution is responsible for proving the relevant intent requirement
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court has explained that another presumption “requires a
court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to
39
separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”
Secondly, Congress is presumed to act purposefully when it uses
particular language in one section of an Act but omits it from
40
another.
Section 875(c) does not include a subjective-intent requirement.
One of its predecessors dealing with demands for ransom, however,
41
18 U.S.C. § 876 required finding “intent to extort.” This raises the
question of whether Congress meant to depart from the subjectiveintent requirement it used in § 876, or whether it merely no longer felt
it necessary to include these exact words.
C. Unprotected Speech
The Supreme Court has historically understood the First
42
Amendment to prohibit content-based restrictions on speech. The
reasoning for the presumption is the first-principles notion “that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
43
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”

37. 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 609 (2d ed. 1989).
38. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994).
39. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 256–57 (2000) (quoting X-Citement Video, 513
U.S. at 72).
40. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
41. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 876(b) (West 2014) (“Whoever, with intent to extort from any
person any money or other thing of value, so deposits . . . any communication containing any
threat to kidnap any person . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.”).
42. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 652, 660 (2004) (holding that the government bears
the burden of showing the constitutionality of content-based restrictions on speech).
43. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).

LARSON 3.3.2015 - FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

90

3/4/2015 10:41 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 10

However, as cherished a refrain of liberty as the First Amendment
44
is, the right has always been qualified. Among the legitimate
purposes for which the Court has permitted restricting speech based
on content is “protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from
the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the
45
threatened violence will occur.” The common law carved out
exceptions for such content-based restrictions as obscenity,
46
defamation, and incitement, and the Court endorsed those
exceptions with a few of its more famous one-liners, including Justice
47
Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” regarding obscenity and Justice
48
Holmes’s “falsely shouting fire in a theater” regarding incitement.
In Watts v. United States, the Court found another exception for
49
“true threats” of physical violence. The speaker in Watts was
protesting the Vietnam War at a rally in Washington, D.C. He told a
crowd, “I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
50
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” The Supreme Court reversed
his conviction for making a threat against the President finding that
51
the statement was political hyperbole and thus not a true threat.
Critical to the Court’s decision in Watts was the context of the
statement, the expressly conditional nature of the statement, and the
52
reaction of the listeners—the crowd had laughed in response.
D. Virginia v. Black
After its 1969 decision in Watts, the Supreme Court did not revisit
53
the true threat exception until 2003. In Black, the Court defined a
44. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (“From 1791 to the present . . .
the First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited
areas.”).
45. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
46. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69 (collecting authorities).
47. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
48. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
49. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (finding that a statute criminalizing
threats against the life of the President was constitutional, but that “[w]hat is a threat must be
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech”).
50. Id. at 706.
51. See id. at 708 (reasoning that “[the Court] must interpret the language Congress chose
‘against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open’” (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
52. Id.
53. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding that a Virginia statute banning
cross-burning was unconstitutional because it failed to distinguish between protected and
unprotected speech).
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true threat as a statement “where the speaker means to communicate
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
54
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” The
Court added that intent to carry out the threat is not required because
the threat alone causes harm in addition to any violence that may
follow. The words themselves are harmful. Therefore, a prohibition on
true threats “protects individuals from the fear of violence and the
55
disruption that fear engenders.”
In Black, the defendant led a Ku Klux Klan rally in an open field
56
by a state highway and burned a twenty-five to thirty-foot cross,
which the sheriff was able to observe from the side of the road as cars
57
passed. The defendant was convicted under a Virginia statute that
criminalized burning a cross in public “with the intent of intimidating
58
any person.” The same statute also provided that the public cross59
burning “shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.”
The Court held this “prima facie evidence” provision facially
unconstitutional because it “ignore[d] all the contextual factors that
are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning was
intended to intimidate . . . [t]he First Amendment does not permit
60
such a shortcut.”
E. Circuit Precedent Before and After Virginia v. Black
From 1964 to 1976, four circuit courts of appeals considered
61
convictions under § 875(c), deciding, in the words of the Ninth
62
Circuit, that “intent to threaten is an essential element of the crime.”
But, over time, this intent requirement fell by the wayside. Before the
Supreme Court decided Black, the Third Circuit had ruled in United
63
States v. Kosma that a true threat requires:
[T]he defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in
a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
13-983).
62.
63.

Id. at 359.
Id. at 344 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 348–49.
Id. at 348 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (West 1996)).
Id.
Id. at 367.
See Brief for Petitioner at 25–26, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No.
United States v. LeVison, 418 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1969).
951 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1991).
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those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take
the life of the President, and that the statement not be the result of
64
mistake, duress, or coercion.

Thus, the Third Circuit rejected a subjective-intent requirement
for threats against the President and instead required proof that the
65
speech was objectively threatening. Though Kosma dealt with 18
U.S.C. § 871, in United States v. Himmelwright the Third Circuit held
66
Kosma’s true-threat analysis also applies to § 875(c).
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit have likewise upheld
objective-intent standards. Those circuits considered Black and did
67
not find the decision to require a subjective intent to threaten. Only
the Ninth Circuit has found the true threats definition in Black to
require that the speaker subjectively “intend for his language to
68
threaten the victim.” The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the prima facie
evidence provision made the Virginia statute unconstitutional
69
“because it effectively eliminated the intent requirement.”
III. HOLDING
The issue before the Third Circuit in United States v. Elonis was
whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black required
proof of a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten for a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). If Black did so require, the decision would
overturn circuit precedent that “a statement is a true threat when a
reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be interpreted
70
as a threat.” The Third Circuit held that Black did not alter its
71
precedent, reiterating that this standard protects non-threatening

64. See United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonableperson test in accordance at the time with the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits). The Ninth Circuit currently uses a subjective intent test, which it set forth in
the aftermath of Black with its decision in United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (2005).
65. Kosma, 951 F.2d at 557.
66. United States v. Himmelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 783 (3d Cir. 1994).
67. See United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 509 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that the Court in
Black did not indicate “it was redefining a general intent crime such as § 875(c) to be a specific
intent crime”); United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) (deciding that “the
position reads too much into Black”); United States v. Nicklas, 713 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 2013)
(holding the government does not have to prove a defendant’s subjective intent).
68. United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005).
69. Id. at 632 (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 385 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
70. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013).
71. Id. at 332.
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speech while simultaneously addressing the harm caused by true
72
threats.
The court concluded that Black was not dispositive because the
Virginia statute required subjective intent to intimidate. Thus, the
Court could not have rejected an objectively-threatening standard
73
just by striking down the statute.
Regarding the Supreme Court’s general description of true threats
as encompassing “those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
74
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,”
Judge Scirica, writing for the court, read the definition narrowly to
mean only “that the speaker must intend to make the
75
communication,” which he distinguished from an intent to be
76
understood.
By extending the requirement to a subjective intent to threaten,
the court reasoned, “speech that a reasonable speaker would
understand to be threatening” would be protected and individuals
suffering from “the fear of violence” and the “disruption that fear
77
engenders” would not be protected. The court could not tolerate
such a result.
Finally, the court decided that the reasons Virginia’s prima facie
evidence provision was unconstitutional did not disturb circuit
78
precedent. The court contrasted the prima facie evidence
provision—which the Black Court labeled an impermissible
shortcut—with the reasonable-person standard, which includes
considering context “to determine whether the statement was a
79
serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm.” Using this
reasonable-person standard, the Third Circuit concluded that its
consideration of the context of Elonis’s speech was sufficient to avoid
the pitfall the Black Court identified.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 329.
74. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
75. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 330.
76. See id. (“It would require adding language the Court did not write to read the passage
as ‘statements where the speaker means to communicate and intends the statement to be
understood as a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.’”
(quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359)).
77. Id.(quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 360).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Elonis’s Arguments
Elonis advances two arguments. First, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, he argues that the text of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires
80
proof of a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten. Second, he
maintains that, without the subjective-intent requirement, § 875(c)
criminalizes negligent speech, which would violate the First
81
Amendment. Running through both of these arguments is a quote
82
from Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in United States v. Alvarez :
“mens rea requirements . . . provide ‘breathing room’ . . . by reducing
an honest speaker’s fear that he may accidentally incur liability for
83
speaking.”
Elonis argues that the plain meaning of § 875(c) requires proof of
84
a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten. Because the statute does
not define the word “threat,” Elonis claims that it should be
interpreted according to its “ordinary, contemporary, common
85
meaning,” for which he enlists the help of the Oxford English
86
87
Dictionary, Webster’s New International Dictionary, and Black’s
88
Law Dictionary. Each includes an intent component in the definition
89
of “threat.” For example, Black’s Law Dictionary in 2004 defined
“threat” as “[a] communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on
90
another.”
Next, Elonis contends that even though § 875(c) does not define
“threat,” neighboring sections that also address the communication of
91
threats include subjective-intent components. For example, Elonis
cites § 876, which prohibits demands for ransom “with intent to
extort.” Because Congress passed § 875(c) after § 876, and because it

80. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 22.
81. Id. at 34.
82. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 2553.
84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 22.
85. Id. at 22–23 (quoting Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014)).
86. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 23.
87. Id. Webster’s New International Dictionary in 1954 defined “threat” as “an expression
of an intention to inflict loss or harm on another by illegal means, esp[ecially] when effecting
coercion or duress.” WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2633 (2d ed. 1954).
88. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 23.
89. Id.
90. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (8th ed. 2004).
91. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 24.
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did not expressly say it was removing a defendant’s subjective intent
from the definition of “threat,” Elonis asserts that it was expanding on
92
its earlier legislation. Therefore, “threat” kept its meaning.
From 1964 to 1976, four circuit courts of appeals determined
“intent to threaten is an essential element of the crime” under §
93
875(c). Elonis maintains that these cases were never overruled, but
that, over time, circuits initially requiring showings of both subjective
94
and objective intent began only using the objective test.
The last statutory-interpretation argument Elonis makes comes
from a principle distinction between criminal and civil law in the
95
United States. As the Supreme Court stated in Morissette v. United
96
States, the criminal law requires actus reus and mens rea, a bad act
97
98
and a bad thought. Injury alone is not enough. Elonis takes from
this rule the canon that the “existence of a mens rea is the rule of,
rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American
99
criminal jurisprudence,” and argues that even if § 875(c) does not
specify a mens rea, the Court should nonetheless “presum[e] that
100
some form of scienter is to be implied.” Elonis maintains that
Congress must explicitly dispense with such an intent requirement;
because it did not do so when it passed § 875(c), the Court should
101
read a subjective-intent standard into the statute.
As a First Amendment matter, Elonis argues that, without the
requirement of a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten, § 875(c)
102
criminalizes negligent speech, which is unconstitutional. Elonis
begins with the rule “that content-based restrictions on speech be
presumed invalid, and that the government bear the burden of
103
104
showing their constitutionality.” The Court in Watts v. United States

92. Id. at 24–25.
93. Id. at 25 (quoting United States v. LeVison, 418 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1969)).
94. Id. at 26.
95. See id.
96. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
97. Id. at 251.
98. See id. at 250 (“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.”) (emphasis added).
99. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 26 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 605 (1994)).
100. Id. at 27 (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 34.
103. Id. at 34–35 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004)).
104. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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made an exception to the rule for “true threats” of physical violence.
But Elonis emphasizes that it is a limited exception, contrary to most
106
First Amendment doctrine.
Elonis argues that the exception for true threats does not remove
107
negligent speech from First Amendment protection. In the first
place, there is “no established tradition of subjecting speech to
criminal liability as a ‘threat’ absent a subjective intent to threaten; to
the contrary, history suggests such an intent is a fundamental
108
prerequisite to imposing liability.”
Elonis cites encyclopedias,
treatises, and Section 212.5 comment 1 of the Model Penal Code for
the proposition that it was not an indictable offense at common law to
make a threat if the only result was that it elicited fear in the
109
listener. Some states passed laws criminalizing threats when the
110
result amounted to disturbance of the public peace, but even then,
Elonis contends, the threat “must be intended to put the person
111
threatened in fear of bodily harm.”
Secondly, Elonis looks to the other types of speech for which the
Court has deemed sanctions constitutional—including incitement,
defamation of public figures, fraudulent fundraising calls, and false
112
statements. Elonis claims that the Court has consistently required
113
proof of a prohibited intent. For incitement, for example, the
defendant’s “advocacy of the use of force . . . [must be] directed to
114
inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” For defamation of
115
public figures, the speaker has to have acted with “actual malice.” In
each example, Elonis asserts that, although the requirements may
protect some harmful speech, the requirements ultimately “exist[] to
116
allow more speech.”

105. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 35.
106. See id. (listing obscenity, defamation, and incitement as some of the few other areas
where the Court has permitted content-based restrictions on speech).
107. Id. at 36.
108. Id. (applying Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537,
2554 (2012)).
109. See id. at 36–37.
110. See id. (quoting 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 803 (Ronald
A. Anderson ed., 12th ed. 1957)).
111. Id. (quoting 2 WHARTON, supra note 110 (emphasis added)).
112. Id. at 39.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
115. Id. at 41 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
116. Id. at 43 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (opinion of
Kennedy, J.)).
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Finally, Elonis argues that the Court’s precedent in Virginia v.
Black established the “impermissibility of allowing liability for speech
117
without proof of wrongful intent.” In Black, the Court described
true threats as “encompass[ing] those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
118
individuals.” Elonis, emphasizing the word “means,” thus draws the
Court’s attention to the speaker’s subjective intent to communicate “a
serious expression,” unlike Third Circuit’s holding below—that the
119
speaker only had to intend to communicate.
B. The Government’s Arguments
The Government makes both statutory-interpretation argument
and First Amendment arguments. First, it argues that a subjective
intent to threaten is not an element of § 875(c), and thus the statute
120
only requires a mens rea of general intent. Second, it argues that
“[t]rue threats, whether or not subjectively intended as such, lie
121
‘outside the First Amendment.’”
The Government argues that the text of § 875(c) makes no
122
mention of a subjective-intent requirement. However, it prefaces its
statutory interpretation argument by rebutting Elonis’s contention
that, without a subjective-intent requirement, speech would be
123
impermissibly chilled. The Government narrows the purpose of the
statute, stating that “[s]ection 875(c) reaches only ‘true threat[s],’; it
does not reach jest, ‘political hyperbole,’ or ‘vehement,’ ‘caustic,’ or
‘unpleasantly sharp attacks’ that fall short of serious expressions of an
124
intent to do harm.”
It is a canon of statutory interpretation that “[w]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
125
another section of the same Act,” it does so purposely. Because the
statute does not have an express mens rea element, the Government,
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)) (emphasis in original) .
119. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2013).
120. Brief for Respondent at 18, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13983).
121. Id. at 35 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
122. Id. at 18.
123. See id. at 21 (“A defendant is always free to explain his intention in making a
particular statement, and a jury must weigh the defendant’s explanation of his intent.”).
124. Id. at 19 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706–08 (1969)).
125. Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation omitted)).
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126

like Elonis, argues that one must be inferred. But, unlike Elonis, the
127
Government urges the Court to infer a general-intent requirement,
as opposed to reading a subjective-intent requirement into the
128
statute. The Government emphasizes that the statute’s neighboring
sections expressly mention specific intent requirements, and thus
Congress intentionally dispensed with such a requirement in §
129
875(c).
The Government argues that Elonis’s proffered definitions of
“threat” do not support finding a subjective-intent requirement in the
130
text of the statute. Instead, the dictionary definitions Elonis cites
better support understanding a threat as “the message that is
131
‘express[ed]’ or ‘communicated.’” In other words, the Government
insists that a threat is in the eye of the person threatened. In its brief,
the Government gives the example of someone who receives a death
threat in the mail: he would call it a threat, even if he did not know
132
the sender or the sender’s intent.
The Government further argues that the purpose of the statute
was to remedy the “undue narrowness of the existing specific-intent
133
requirement for threat prosecutions.” Before Congress passed the
predecessor of § 875(c), federal law prohibited sending threats with
an intent to extort, and the Department of Justice asked Congress to
134
supplement the law to make it “more flexible.” Accordingly, the
Government concludes that the Court should interpret § 875(c)
consistent with this request.
The Government’s last statutory-interpretation argument is that
reading § 875(c) to define a general-intent offense satisfies the
135
presumption in favor of scienter. “The presumption in favor of
scienter . . . ‘requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea
which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise
136
innocent conduct.’” For a § 875(c) conviction, all the defendant must

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 28.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 22.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 120, at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 28.
Id. (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (citations omitted)).
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137

know are the facts that make his conduct illegal. Thus, a speaker
would only need to know that “he transmitted a communication and
138
that he comprehended its contents and context.” In this way, a
defendant would not be convicted “based on a fact . . . beyond [his]
139
awareness.”
As a First Amendment matter, the Government argues that true
threats fall outside of constitutional protection “because the harms
that true threats inflict—fear and disruption[]—take place regardless
140
of the speaker’s unexpressed intention.” Thus, the Government puts
the focus on the statement’s impact on the listener, as “[a] statement
that is threatening to a reasonable person has little legitimate
141
expressive value.” To avoid the harm done by true threats, the
Government argues that Congress can eliminate them as a mode of
142
speech without infringing on the First Amendment.
The Government distinguishes a speaker’s subjective intent to
143
threaten from the criteria listed by the Court in Watts. Whether a
true threat exists depends on the statement’s “context,” its “expressly
144
conditional nature,” and “the reaction of the listeners.” Citing
Virginia v. Black, the Government additionally emphasizes that the
Supreme Court has not yet finished defining the category of true
145
threats.
Combining its understanding of these cases, the
Government argues that when the Court uses the word “encompass”
146
in its description, it means that there can be other kinds of true
threats, besides intimidation, for which conviction does not require
147
proving a defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.
V. ANALYSIS
The Court should hold that proof of a defendant’s subjective
intent to threaten is required for conviction under § 875(c). Both sides
137. Id.
138. Id. at 29.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 35.
141. Id. at 36.
142. Id. at 37 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)).
143. See id. at 40 (“The Court did not look to the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten.”).
144. Id. (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)).
145. Id. at 41–42.
146. “True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.” Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (emphasis added).
147. Brief for Respondent, supra note 120, at 41.
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argue for the Court to read some level of mens rea into the statute.
Importantly, it is unlikely in practice that instituting a subjectiveintent requirement, rather than the Third Circuit’s test, would result in
148
significantly fewer convictions under the statute. And with little
difference in outcomes, other factors should persuade the Court to
affirmatively hold that conviction under § 875(c) requires proving
subjective intent.
The Government seems to fear that the subjective-intent
requirement could allow a defendant to testify to an unexpressed,
innocuous intent, and thereby avoid conviction. But in its own words,
“[w]hat a speaker’s unexpressed intent cannot do . . . is convert
statements that a reasonable person would understand as threatening,
149
in context, into innocuous statements or merely letting off steam.”
The government means to forbid the use of an unexpressed intent to
exculpate a speaker, but the word “cannot” more accurately means
that it is impossible for any unexpressed intent to which the speaker
testifies to automatically exculpate him.
Concretely, even if a defendant testifies to an innocuous intent at
trial, his subjective intent to threaten can be proven with evidence.
This way, it is still left up to the jury to make a credibility
determination, weighing the defendant’s stated intent along with any
other evidence of his unexpressed intent in order to ultimately decide
his subjective intent. Here, despite Elonis’s disclaimers in his posts
and his use of parody and music, it is not impossible that he might
have nonetheless been convicted upon a finding of him having a
subjective intent to threaten his wife. Such a finding could be based,
for example, on how he treated his wife in the past or what he told
others about their relationship.
Several factors weigh in favor of finding a subjective-intent
requirement, and each will be discussed in turn. First, a hypothetical
application of an objective test to the facts in Black shows that such a
requirement would have disincentivized legitimate political speech.
Second, balancing the obligations such a requirement would impose
on the government versus potential speakers, the government would
148. In addition to the reasons discussed here, Professor Kenneth Karst argues that the
current law on true threats decides cases based on the specific facts before the court, and not by
means of any strict adherence to precedent. He concludes this does not mean “surrender[ing] to
lawlessness,” but rather just that judges will have to judge. Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and
Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1411
(2006).
149. Brief for Respondent, supra note 120, at 21 (emphasis added).
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have less of a burden in proving subjective intent than potential
speakers would have in calculating their risk. Third, the Court’s
general description of true threats in Black, although it is not binding
here, can only be read grammatically such that the speaker must mean
to “communicate” intent to threaten.
A. Hypothetical Application of Objective Intent to the Facts in Black
The Government asserts that Black struck down a Virginia statute
because the statute lacked a requirement that the state provide any
amount of context. So long as an objective test involves some
contextual investigation, then it passes muster under the First
Amendment. But the facts of Black, viewed in light of an objective
test, might still fail to differentiate between protected political speech
and a type of true threat; this can be illustrated by applying the
objective-intent standard from the Third Circuit as set forth in United
150
States v. Kosma. In Judge Scirica’s words, “a statement is a true
threat when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would
151
be interpreted as a threat.”
In Black, the sheriff was able to observe the defendant burning a
twenty-five to thirty-foot cross from the side of a state highway where
cars were passing. If at least some of the Ku Klux Klan members at
the cross-burning were “reasonable” and they were also aware of
their reputation, then—to apply the Third Circuit’s objective-test—
they are guilty of making a true threat so long as they would have
foreseen the cross-burning being interpreted as a threat. Next to the
highway, some “reasonable” Klan members would have to have
foreseen at least one passing car taking the cross-burning to be a
threat. In essence, their reputation precedes them and all but prevents
a jury from ever distinguishing political speech from intimidation. In
this way, the objective test prohibits a group like the Ku Klux Klan
from ever legally burning a cross in public, an issue that looks eerily
similar to the one the Court spotted with the prima facie evidence
152
provision. If, however, a subjective-intent standard applies, the jury
would still be free to infer from the location of the rally that the
defendant subjectively intended to intimidate, knowing passing cars
150. 951 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1991).
151. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013).
152. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (“The act of burning a cross may mean
that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation. But that same act may
mean only that the person is engaged in core political speech. The prima facie evidence
provision . . . blurs the line between these two meanings of a burning cross.”).
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would notice the cross-burning. Thus, the cross-burner could still be
convicted. An objective standard would have provided some context,
but not enough to protect politically legitimate speech.
B. Balancing Obligations
The Government’s contention that a threat, regardless of the
speaker’s subjective intent to threaten, is harmful in its own right is
reasonable but breaks down in application. Most critically, it raises
alternative obligations. On the one hand, under an objective standard,
a speaker has an obligation to foresee how his words may be taken,
which, as Elonis points out, is increasingly difficult in the rapidly
153
expanding universe of social media. On the other hand, the
government can put on evidence to prove that a speaker subjectively
intended to threaten the listener, and it would have to present
evidence to meet an objective standard anyway. Thus, balancing these
alternative obligations, the cost to the government is arguably much
154
lower than to potential speakers.
C. “Communicate” is Acting as aTtransitive Verb
Finally, although it was not decisive in Black, the Court’s general
description of true threats is exactly the kind of foothold the Court
can use here to find a subjective-intent requirement. Again, the Court
described true threats as encompassing “those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group
155
of individuals.” Judge Scirica argued below that the Court’s
description in Black should be read only to require proof that the
speaker intended to communicate. But this assertion does not make
sense grammatically. The verb “communicate” could be taken to be
intransitive, thus not requiring a direct object if it were at the end of

153. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 49–50 (arguing that the lack of “tone” and
“mannerisms” on the Internet multiplies the potential for misunderstanding, and even
emoticons, invented to add context, are subject to interpretation (quoting Kyle A. Mabe, Long
Live the King: United States v. Bagdasarian and the Subjective-Intent Standard for Presidential
“True-Threat” Jurisprudence, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 88 (2013))).
154. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 283, 316–17 (2001) (“Speakers will have difficulty telling in advance what will be
construed as a threat by a jury, and therefore may be deterred from speaking even where their
speech is not negligent.”). The article additionally criticizes the objective test for allowing the
possibility for speakers to be convicted, “even where the speaker had no expectation that the
alleged victim would hear the statement.” Id. at 288.
155. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
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the sentence. But, because the sentence continues and there is a direct
object—“a serious expression of an intent”—and no other intervening
verb to take responsibility for it, the most natural reading of
“communicate” is as a transitive verb. The Court’s description, then,
effectively translates to a requirement that a speaker intend to
threaten.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit’s decision in Elonis was appropriate given
ambiguous Supreme Court precedent. But now the Court will likely
use this opportunity to establish a clear precedent and reverse the
Third Circuit for three reasons. First, an objective-intent requirement
would not have distinguished between permissible and impermissible
speech in Black. Second, in most cases the government should be able
to prove subjective intent as easily as proving an objective threat. And
third, the most natural reading of the Court’s own description of true
threats implies a subjective-intent finding. For these reasons, the
Court will likely hold that a speaker must subjectively intend to
threaten to be convicted under the statute. The Court will likely
reverse Elonis’s conviction.

